This is a fascinating excavation of pluralist thought, and you’re right to bring Tocqueville, Cole, and Buber into the same frame. The reminder that associational life once carried real political weight—not just social value—is especially timely.
Putnam’s nostalgia for civic life is one thing; turning bowling leagues into quasi-sovereign bodies is another. The English pluralists saw the dangers of a centralized state, but their cure risks hardening interests into permanent blocs and confusing vocation with political legitimacy.
Still, your argument presses a crucial point: our current form of representation is neither as representative nor as educative as we pretend. Even if Cole’s architecture remains more provocation than blueprint, the provocation is well aimed. - Thanks!
William, I agree with you entirely. Cole's sketch particularly raises a host of questions about how a polity would negotiate the turf among all of the "specialists" that would suddenly be working for public ends. And how would a polity ensure that these specialists would also speak and act in the political world outside their bailiwick? What intrigues me about Cole's approach remains his court that he throws all of these questions at in the form of litigation. From the view of Figgis and maybe McIlwain, such a court would have seemed so wonderfully medieval.
I might have suggested a more balanced approach had I studied H. J. Laski, who Hirst says wanted a territorial system of representation to balance something like Cole's functional representation. Still, yes, provocation: if we ever have a constitutional convention, I'd love for the ideas of Cole et al. to be in the room where it happens.
I’m glad this resonated. You’re right—the real difficulty isn’t the diagnosis but the complexity of coordinating specialists suddenly responsible for public purposes. What’s striking in Cole’s scheme is the judicial cast of his coordinating agency, which—as you note—lands in territory Figgis and McIlwain would recognize as medieval in its blend of functions. (Although I know mostly of Figgis: also an Anglican priest and monk.) And yes, bringing Laski into the conversation would give the balance Cole himself never fully achieved. I share your hope that, if we ever revisit the constitutional frame, these pluralist experiments at least get a hearing.
The British pluralists--feels as if you've opened up a whole new landscape before me! Gratitude, as always.
This is a fascinating excavation of pluralist thought, and you’re right to bring Tocqueville, Cole, and Buber into the same frame. The reminder that associational life once carried real political weight—not just social value—is especially timely.
Putnam’s nostalgia for civic life is one thing; turning bowling leagues into quasi-sovereign bodies is another. The English pluralists saw the dangers of a centralized state, but their cure risks hardening interests into permanent blocs and confusing vocation with political legitimacy.
Still, your argument presses a crucial point: our current form of representation is neither as representative nor as educative as we pretend. Even if Cole’s architecture remains more provocation than blueprint, the provocation is well aimed. - Thanks!
William, I agree with you entirely. Cole's sketch particularly raises a host of questions about how a polity would negotiate the turf among all of the "specialists" that would suddenly be working for public ends. And how would a polity ensure that these specialists would also speak and act in the political world outside their bailiwick? What intrigues me about Cole's approach remains his court that he throws all of these questions at in the form of litigation. From the view of Figgis and maybe McIlwain, such a court would have seemed so wonderfully medieval.
I might have suggested a more balanced approach had I studied H. J. Laski, who Hirst says wanted a territorial system of representation to balance something like Cole's functional representation. Still, yes, provocation: if we ever have a constitutional convention, I'd love for the ideas of Cole et al. to be in the room where it happens.
Thank you for the benefit of your thoughts here!
I’m glad this resonated. You’re right—the real difficulty isn’t the diagnosis but the complexity of coordinating specialists suddenly responsible for public purposes. What’s striking in Cole’s scheme is the judicial cast of his coordinating agency, which—as you note—lands in territory Figgis and McIlwain would recognize as medieval in its blend of functions. (Although I know mostly of Figgis: also an Anglican priest and monk.) And yes, bringing Laski into the conversation would give the balance Cole himself never fully achieved. I share your hope that, if we ever revisit the constitutional frame, these pluralist experiments at least get a hearing.